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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 08-3869




LOUIS G. STESIS; 
DEBORAH GASTON; 
KAREN J. CUBA, IN THEIR OFFICIAL
AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES
                              
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-2907)
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
                              
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 5, 2009
Before:  BARRY, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: April 10, 2009)
                              
OPINION
                              
PER CURIAM
Thomas Washam, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the decision of the District
2Court granting the Defendant-Appellees’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).  We agree with the decision of the District Court and will dismiss the appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I
In October 1987, Washam was convicted in the Delaware County Court of
Common Pleas (DCCCP) of first-degree murder, for which he was sentenced to life
imprisonment.  He received no relief on direct appeal and, between 1991 and 2006, filed
several petitions for post-conviction relief, both at the state and federal levels.  All such
petitions were denied or dismissed.
In August 2007, Washam filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Washam’s complaint alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by the
“malfeasance” of Louis Stesis, a Delaware County Assistant District Attorney; the
“nonfeasance” of Deborah Gaston, the Director of the Office of Judicial Support for the
DCCCP; and the “misfeasance” of Karen Cuba, the Administrator of the Jury
Commission for the DCCCP.  In effect, Washam argues that the Defendants’ acts amount
to a Batson violation.  Stesis, followed by Gaston and Cuba, filed motions to dismiss
Washam’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which the District Court granted.  Washam filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
A federal court must dismiss the complaint or appeal of a plaintiff proceeding in
3forma pauperis if the action is “frivolous.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).  The United States
Supreme Court clarified this standard in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989),
stating that a complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
fact.”  490 U.S. at 325.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review
over the District Court order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motions.  See McGovern v.
Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  “We accept all well-pleaded allegations
in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [Washam’s] favor.”  Id. 
Because Washam is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally.  See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972).  “The District Court’s judgment is proper only if,
accepting all factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most
favorable to [Washam], we determine that [Washam] is not entitled to relief under any
reasonable reading of the complaint.”  McGovern, 554 F.3d at 115.
The District Court reasoned that Washam’s § 1983 complaint is barred on three
grounds.  First, Washam’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations.  A two-year statute
of limitations applies to § 1983 claims arising from conduct in Pennsylvania.  See
Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).  A §
1983 “cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury
upon which [the] action is based.”  Id.  The District Court determined that because
Washam seeks relief based on an alleged Batson violation at his 1987 murder trial, his
     Notably, Stesis was not even the prosecutor involved in Washam’s murder trial. 1
Rather, he represented the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in Washam’s PCRA
proceedings.
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complaint was filed long after the expiration of the limitations period.  We agree.
We also agree with the District Court’s determination that Washam’s claim is
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  Under Heck, a plaintiff may not
pursue a claim under § 1983 for actions that would directly or implicitly call into question
the validity of his conviction unless he demonstrates that the “conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”  Id. at 486-87.  Because Washam’s § 1983
complaint seeks relief for conduct that he alleges resulted in an improper conviction due
to a Batson violation, and because that conviction still stands, dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) is appropriate.
Finally, the District Court reasoned that Washam’s claim must be dismissed
because all three defendants are entitled to immunity.  Defendants Gaston and Cuba are
entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity, which applies to court staff acting in their
official capacities.  See Marcedes v. Barrett, 453 F.2d 391, 391 (3d Cir. 1971).  Likewise, 
because prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil suits under § 1983 for their
performance of typical prosecutorial functions and activities, Defendant Stesis is entitled 
 to prosecutorial immunity.   See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993);1
     Washam also seeks to appeal the District Court’s denial of his “motion in opposition”2
to the Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions.  The District Court correctly denied his motion
as moot because the Rule 12(b)(6) motions were granted one month prior to Washam’s
opposition, and concluded that his motion could not be construed as a motion to
reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) because it was untimely.  As such, an appeal from
that order would also be frivolous under Neitzke.
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Impler v. Pactman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).  We agree with the District Court.
Accordingly, Washam’s complaint “lacks an arguable basis [] in law,” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).2
